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1 Introduction
While stimulating economic growth and development, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) has also been considered as an important source of environmental
degradation in its host region. This has fuelled concerns whether it is sustain-
able in the long run to attain economic growth and development through FDI at
the expense of environmental quality. To address this concern, it is important
to question whether multinationals will prefer to invest in regions with more
lenient environmental regulation.
The Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) states that polluting capital will
move to countries with lenient environmental regulation. The empirical litera-
ture on the PHH has been inconclusive. Low and Yeates (1992), Kolstad and
Xing (2001), List and Co (2000), Becker and Henderson (2000), Keller and
Levinson (2002), Kahn (1997), List et al. (2003), Cole and Elliott (2005) as
well as several papers analyzed by Jeppesen et al. (2001) found strong evi-
dence in favor of the PHH. Eskeland and Harrison (2003), and Javorcik and
Wei (2004) however concluded that environmental regulation does not inuence
the location decision of an industry. Indeed, McConnell and Schwab (1990),
Du¤y-Deno (1992), Friedman et al. (1992) and Levinson (1996) found that en-
vironmental regulation had no signicant, and sometimes even a positive, e¤ect
on investment. Dean et al. (2009) found mixed evidence for and against the
PHH.
We propose a new explanation for the mixed empirical evidence regarding
the PHH and especially the nding that strict environmental policy seems to
attract FDI. The empirical models may have been miss-specied in assuming
that the governments set environmental policy before rms decide on FDI and
thus environmental policy a¤ects FDI. Instead, it could be that the rms move
before the governments and thus FDI inuences environmental policy. In our
model, a foreign rm may prefer to move to the home country even though
the home government will respond to this by making its environmental policy
stricter than before and indeed stricter than in the foreign country. Although
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FDI increases the foreign rms costs, it raises its domestic rivals costs even
more. To our knowledge, we are the rst to propose raising rivals cost (Salop
and Sche¤man, 1983, 1987) as a motive for FDI.
There are some papers that model a rms attempts to take advantage of en-
vironmental policy to raise its rivals cost, other than through FDI1 . Sartzetakis
(1997) models a tradable emission permit market in a duopoly with a leader
and a follower. The leader may set a high permit price in order to raise the
followers cost. Puller (2006) shows that a rm has an incentive to innovate so
that the regulator will set a stricter standard, which imposes high costs on its
rivals.
While, as discussed above, most empirical papers have assumed that envi-
ronmental policy a¤ects FDI, Cole et al. (2006) examine the e¤ect of FDI on
environmental policy. They nd that FDI leads to stricter environmental policy
when the government is mostly interested in social welfare (as we predict in our
paper), but to more lenient environmental policy when the government is very
corrupt.
Ulph and Valentini (2001 and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) compare the
games where the governments set their policies before and after the rms make
their location decisions. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) analyze environmental
taxation for a monopolist that can relocate abroad, with foreign environmental
policy exogenously given. Ulph and Valentinis (2001) two-country, two-rm
model di¤ers from ours in that they assume that the rms are completely mobile
at the outset of the game and all of the rms prots accrue to the host country.
We assume that all of the prots of the home (foreign) rm accrue to the home
(foreign) country, and only the foreign rm can relocate. Ulph and Valentini
(2001) take absolute emission limits as the instrument of environmental policy,
whereas in our model we look at environmental taxation as an instrument of
environment policy.
1 In di¤erent settings, Oster (1982) and Michaelis (1994) also analyze a rms actions that
raise its rivals costs more than its own costs. However, unlike the present paper, they do not
model the way in which the rms action leads to di¤erential cost increases.
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De Santis and Stähler (2009) look at the case of bilateral FDI with identical
rms and countries, where rms undertake FDI to avoid the transportation
costs. We explicitly rule out this traditional motive by setting the foreign rms
marginal costs under exporting lower than with FDI. In our paper, the motive
for FDI is that relocation leads to a higher increase in the environmental tax
rate for the home rm than for the foreign rm itself. This motive is absent
in De Santis and Stähler (2009), because the two rms face the same tax rates
when they are located in their own countries, and therefore also the same tax
increase with FDI.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model structure. Section 3 introduces the Cournot model with subsection
3.1 discusses the game under both export and FDI scenarios and subsection 3.2
identies the conditions under which it would be protable for the foreign rm
to do FDI. In subsection 3.3 we look at the special case of equal production
costs. In Section 3.4 we compare the countrieswelfare under export and FDI.
Section 4 introduces the Bertrand model with the subsection discusses the
game under both export and FDI scenarios and subsection 4.2 identies the
conditions under which it would be protable for the foreign rm to do FDI. In
subsection 4.3 we look at the special case of equal production costs.
Under both the cournot and Bertrand models, we will establish the range
of parameter values for which the foreign rm prefers FDI, although it entails
higher costs. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks and scope for future
research.
2 Basic Model
Consider a duopoly with one rm f initially located in the foreign country f
and the other rm h located in the home country h. Firm f has the option to
relocate all of its production to country h, where all the consumers live. There
4
is a xed cost F of relocation.2 The marginal cost of production of the domestic
rm is constant and equal to ch while the marginal cost of production of the
foreign rm is constant and equal to cxf under exports (where c
x
f also includes
the transportation cost) and cRf under FDI.
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We assume that:
cRf  cxf : (1)
i.e the foreign rms marginal cost of production is higher with FDI than with
exporting. As a result, it would not be protable for the foreign rm to under-
take FDI in the absence of environmental regulation. We make this assumption
to ensure that environmental policy is the only reason for the foreign rm to
undertake FDI.
Pollution is a by-product of the production process. There is no technology
available to reduce emissions per unit of output. In scenario s, where s =
R; x, rm i; where i 2 h; f , has output qsi and emissions eqsi . Without loss
of generality, we normalize the emissions-to-output ratio e to one. Thus total
emissions E are then, for the home and foreign country, respectively:
with export: Exh = q
x
h & E
x
f = q
x
f ;
and with FDI : ERh = q
R
h + q
R
f & E
R
f = 0:
Environmental damage Di occurs only in the country i where the emissions
take place, according to:
Di (Ei) = iE
2
i ;
where i is the environmental damage coe¢ cient. The environmental dam-
age coe¢ cient could di¤er from one country to another, because one countrys
ecosystems are more vulnerable to pollution than anothers, or one countrys cit-
izens or government care more about environmental damage than the others.
2F captures all the start-up costs of a new plant, including the adjustment cost of learning
to operate in a new institutional and nancial environment.
3Subscripts i; i = f; h; refer to the foreign and home rm or country, respectively. Super-
scripts s; s = x;R refer to the scenario where the foreign rm is exporting and relocating,
respectively.
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Marginal damage MDi is then given by:
MDi = 2iEi: (2)
Environmental policy in country i, i = f; h, under scenario s, s = x;R, con-
sists of a tax tsi per unit of emissions. Since rms cannot reduce their emissions
per unit of output, the environmental tax is e¤ectively on output.
In addition to (1), we impose a condition on the parameters such that:4
tRh + c
R
f > t
x
f + c
x
f ; (3)
i.e. full marginal costs (including production and transport costs as well
as environmental taxation) are higher with FDI than with exports.The game
between the rms and the governments takes place in a perfect-information
setting5 and consists of three stages. In the rst stage, rm f decides whether to
export or to undertake FDI. In stage two, the governments set the environmental
tax rate that maximizes their countrys welfare. In the nal stage, the two rms
set their output levels.
3 The Cournot model
Under the Cournot duopoly we assume that both the rms produce a homoge-
nous good and the rms face a linear market demand:
P = A  qsh   qsf ;
with A > 0, P the product price and qsi the output by rm i;where i 2 h; f; in
scenario s; where s = x;R. Dene for simplicity:
axf = A  cxf > 0 aRf = A  cRf > 0 ah = A  ch > 0: (4)
Assumption (1) can then be written as:
aRf  axf : (5)
4We will present the condition in terms of the exogenous parameters as (26) in subsection
3.1.2, after having solved for tRh and t
x
f .
5See Bommer (1999) for a rms incentive to relocate under asymmetric information.
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Using (5), this can be rewritten as:
tRh   aRf > txf   axf : (6)
We impose this condition to make sure that the foreign rm does not relocate
in order to take advantage of lower costs in the home country.
3.1 Government Policy
In this section we analyze the second and third stage of the game. In stage
two, the governments decide on their environmental policies and in stage three
the rms set their output levels. In subsection 3.1.1 (3.1.2), we analyze the
sub-game where the foreign rm has decided to export (undertake FDI).
3.1.1 Foreign rm exports
In this sub-game the foreign rm has decided, in stage one, to export. We start
our analysis in stage three, where the two rms i, i = f; h, set the output levels
that maximize their prots xi . The maximization problem for rm i, i = f; h,
is:6
max
qxi
xi =
 
axi   qxi   qx i   txi

qxi ; (7)
with axh = ah: Solving the rst order conditions for the prot-maximizing output
levels as a function of the tax rates yields:
qxi =
2 (axi   txi ) 
 
ax i   tx i

3
: (8)
Substituting (8) into the prot functions (7) yields:
xi =
"
2 (axi   txi ) 
 
ax i   tx i

3
#2
: (9)
In stage two, the home and foreign governments set the environmental tax
rates that maximize social welfare. Social welfare Wi in country i (i = h; f)
is the sum of rm is prot, consumer surplus (for the home country) and
environmental tax revenue, minus environmental damage.
6The second order conditions for all maximization problems in this chapter are satised.
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The foreign government maximizes:
W xf = 
x
f + t
x
fq
x
f   f
 
qxf
2
; (10)
with xf given by (9) and q
x
f given by (8). Di¤erentiating and solving for t
x
f ,
we get:
txf =
(4f   1)

2axf   ah + txh

4 (2f + 1)
: (11)
Similarly the home government maximizes:
W xh = 
x
h +
1
2
 
qxh + q
x
f
2
+ txhq
x
h   h (qxh)2 ; (12)
with xh given by (9) and q
x
h given by (8). Di¤erentiating and solving for t
x
h ,
we get:
txh =
ah (8h   3) + 4h

txf   axf

3 + 8h
: (13)
Substituting (11) into (13) and solving for txh we get:
txh =
ah (3h + 4hf   1  2f )  2haxf
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
: (14)
Substituting (14) into (11) and solving for txf we get:
txf =
(4f   1)

2axfh + a
x
f   ah

2 (1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)
: (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (8), we nd the equilibrium output levels as:
qxh =
3ah + 4fah   axf
2 (1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)
, qxf =
2ha
x
f + a
x
f   ah
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
: (16)
The conditions for qxh and q
x
f to be positive are, respectively:
f >
axf   3ah
4ah
, h >
ah   3axf
2axf
: (17)
We wish to restrict our analysis to the case where the environmental problem
is serious enough to warrant a positive environmental tax. From (14), we see
that txh > 0 if and only if:
h >
ah (1 + 2f )
3ah + 4ahf   2axf
: (18)
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As for the foreign countrys tax rate, the second term in the brackets of the
numerator on the R.H.S of (15) is positive by (17). Thus txf > 0 if and only if:
f >
1
4
: (19)
Using (2) and (16), the environmental tax rate (14) in the home country can
be rewritten as:
txh =MD
x
h  
ha
x
f + ah (1 + 2f )
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
:
Thus the environmental tax rate is lower than the marginal damage from pol-
lution. There are two reasons for this. First, the government wants to correct
the competitive distortion created by the duopoly (the domestic correction in-
centive as pointed out by De Santis and Stähler, 2006). Secondly, the home
government wants to shift the prot from the foreign rm to the domestic rm
(the prot-shifting incentive as pointed out by Brander and Spencer, 1985).7
By (2) and (16), the foreign countrys environmental tax rate (15) too can
be rewritten as:
txf =

1  1
4f

MDxf :
In the foreign country as well, the environmental tax rate is below marginal
damage. This is the result of the prot-shifting strategic incentive for the foreign
government.
Substituting (16), (14) and (15) into the prot function (7), we get the prots
of both rms when the foreign rm is exporting:
xh =

3ah + 4fah   axf
2 (1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)
2
; xf =

2ha
x
f + a
x
f   ah
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
2
: (20)
3.1.2 Foreign rm has undertaken FDI
In this sub-game the foreign rm has decided, in stage one, to relocate its
plant to the home country. In stage three, each rm sets the output level that
maximizes its prots.
7Bay¬nd¬r-Upmann (2003) uses a slightly di¤erent classication into terms-of-trade and
imperfect-competition e¤ects. For the political-support e¤ect in the presence of industry
lobbies, see Schleich and Orden (2000).
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The maximization problem for rm i, i = f; h, is:
max
qRi
Ri =
 
aRi   qRi   qR i   tRh

qRi   Fi; (21)
with aRh = ah and xed cost Ff = F; Fh = 0:The rst order condition gives
prot maximising output as
qRi =
2aRi   a i   tRh
3
: (22)
Substituting this into the prot function (21) of the rms gives us the equi-
librium levels of prot as:
Ri =

2aRi   a i   tRh
3
2
  Fi: (23)
In stage two of the game, the home government sets the welfare maximising
environmental tax rate:
max
tRh
Wh = 
R
h +
1
2
 
qRh + q
R
f
2
+ tRh
 
qRh + q
R
f
  h  qRh + qRf 2 : (24)
with Rh given by (23) and q
R
h and q
R
f by (22). Taking the rst order condition
and simplifying for tRh ; we get:
tRh =
ah (4h   3) + aRf (3 + 4h)
8h + 6
: (25)
Using (15) and (25) where txf and t
R
h are solved for, we can rewrite condition
(6) in terms of the exogenous parameters as:
f <
3ah
 
42h   3h   2
  (4h + 3) haRf (3h + 1)  axf (8h + 3)i
2
h
aRf (4h + 3) (2h + 1)  ah
 
3 + 6h + 8
2
h
i : (26)
Substituting the environmental tax rate (25) into the output levels of the
rms (22) yields the prot maximizing output levels as follows:
qRf =
aRf (3 + 4h)  ah (1 + 4h)
6 + 8h
, qRh =
ah (5 + 4h)  aRf (3 + 4h)
6 + 8h
: (27)
We see that qRf > 0 always holds for a
R
f  ah: It also holds for aRf < ahwhen:
h <
3aRf   ah
4

ah   aRf
 : (28)
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Similarly from (27), qRh > 0 always holds for ah  aRf :It also holds for
ah < a
R
f when:
h <
5ah   3aRf
4

aRf   ah
 : (29)
Using (2) and (27), the home countrys environmental tax rate can be rewrit-
ten as:
tRh =
aRf   ah
2
+MDRh :
As before, the domestic correction incentive leads the government to lower
the tax rate below marginal damage. On the other hand, the prot-shifting
incentive now calls for a higher tax rate than when the foreign rm is located
in the foreign country. When the two rmsproduction costs are the same, the
two incentives cancel each other out and the environmental tax rate is equal to
the marginal environmental damage (De Santis and Stähler, 2006). However,
if the foreign rm is more productive than the home rm, the prot-shifting
incentive dominates the domestic correction incentive and the tax rate is above
marginal damage. The reverse occurs if the home rm is more productive.
On comparing the home environmental tax rates under export and when the
foreign rm does FDI, we see that:8
Lemma 1: The home countrys environmental tax rate is higher when the
foreign rm relocates its plant to the home country than when it exports, i.e.
tRh > t
x
h:
The home country will set a higher tax rate under FDI, because there are now
two rms on its territory rather than one. Pollution in the home country will be
worse under FDI than under export by the foreign rm, since, under FDI, both
the home and foreign rms produce and pollutes in the home country, whereas,
under export, only the home rm pollutes in the home country. Therefore, the
environmental tax rate has to increase in order to protect the environment.
8The proof is in Appendix A.
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Finally, the two rmsprots are, substituting (25) into (23):
Rf =
"
aRf (3 + 4h)  ah (1 + 4h)
6 + 8h
#2
 F &Rh =
"
ah (5 + 4h)  aRf (3 + 4h)
6 + 8h
#2
:
(30)
3.2 Export or FDI?
Having analyzed the second (government policy) and third (rmsoutput) stages
of the game in the previous section, we now move to stage one where the foreign
rm decides between exporting and undertaking FDI. The foreign rm prefers
FDI to exports if Rf > 
x
f :
Comparing the foreign rms prots (20) under export and (30) under FDI,
we nd:
Lemma 2: The foreign rm prefers FDI to exporting if and only if its xed
cost of relocation F is below F^ , where
F^ 
"
aRf (3 + 4h)  ah (1 + 4h)
6 + 8h
#2
 

2ha
x
f + a
x
f   ah
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
2
:
F^ may be negative, which means that prots under exports are higher than
under FDI, even without taking relocation costs into account. Thus for FDI to
be protable, F^ has to be positive.
From Lemma 4.2, this implies:9
Proposition 1: The foreign rm prefers FDI to exports for low enough
relocation costs F if and only if:
aRf (3 + 4h)  ah (1 + 4h)
6 + 8h
>
2ha
x
f + a
x
f   ah
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
; (31)
and this along with qRh > 0 is satised only if
h < f :
To explain the intuition behind this result, we substitute the prots under
export and under FDI from (9) and (23) to rewrite condition (31) as:
2

axf   txf

  (ah   txh)
3
<
2aRf   ah   tRh
3
:
9The proof for h < f is in Appendix B.
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Rearranging yields:
Corollary 1: The foreign rms prefers FDI to export for low enough relo-
cation cost F if and only if 
tRh + ch
  (txh + ch) > 2  tRh + cRf    txf + cxf ;
i.e. the home rms increase in full marginal cost is more than twice the
foreign rms increase.
We see that although FDI raises the foreign rms own cost, it can still
be worthwhile for the rm to relocate, as FDI may raise its competitors cost
by even more. As Lemma 4.1 has shown, the home government increases its
environmental tax rate with FDI, because domestic production and pollution
will be higher with two rms in the country than with one rm. It is therefore
clear that FDI raises the home rms costs. FDI also raises the foreign rms
costs by assumption (3) which we have made to rule out lower costs as a motive
for FDI.10
3.3 Equal Production Costs
In this section we examine the special case where the marginal costs of produc-
tion of the foreign rm under export and under FDI are equal to the marginal
cost of production of the domestic rm:
aRf = a
x
f = ah = a: (32)
This enables us to have a closer look at the conditions under which the
foreign rm will undertake FDI and to compare the countrieswelfare under
FDI and exports.
Lemma 4.2 now becomes:
Lemma 3: Under condition (32), the foreign rm prefers FDI to exporting
if and only if its xed cost of relocation F is below ~F ; where
~F 

2a
8h + 6
2
 

2ah
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
2
:
10Corollary 1 is in line with Oster (1982) and Michaelis (1994). However, they do not model
the way in which regulation leads to a di¤erential cost increase for the two rms.
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Proposition 4.1 now becomes:
Proposition 2: Under condition (32), the foreign rm prefers FDI to ex-
porting for low enough relocation cost F if and only if:
f >
82h + 3h   1
2 (2h + 1)
: (33)
In Figure 1, this condition is satised above the "FDI" curve.
Corollary 1 now becomes:
Corollary 2: Under condition (32), the foreign rm prefers FDI to export-
ing for low enough relocation cost F if and only if:
tRh   txh > 2
 
tRh   txf

;
i.e. the tax increase for the domestic rm is at least twice the increase for
the foreign rm.
Condition (6) that ensures that costs for the foreign rm are larger in the
home country now becomes tRh > t
x
f : From (26) and (32) this holds when:
f <
7 + 16h
4
: (34)
In Figure 1, this condition is satised below the line marked "tRh > t
x
f".
From (16) and the analysis in (29) and (28), we see that the output levels
qRf ; q
R
h ; q
x
h; q
x
f will always be positive with (32). The condition for t
x
f > 0 is
f >
1
4 ;as in (19). The condition is not shown in Figure 1, because it can be
seen from the gure that it will never be binding. Substituting (32) into (18),
we see that txh > 0 holds when:
h >
1 + 2f
1 + 4f
: (35)
In Figure 1, this condition is satised to the right of the curve marked
"txh > 0".
The two shaded areas in Figure 1 indicate the parameter range where the
foreign rm prefers to undertake FDI although it will have to pay a higher
environmental tax.
14
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Figure 1: Environmental damage coe¢ cients f and h where FDI is preferred
over exports under Cournot Competition
3.4 Welfare
In this section we will compare the two countrieswelfare with FDI and export
under the condition (32), i.e. all marginal production costs are equal.
Substituting (32), the prot of the domestic rm under export (20), the
environmental tax rate (14), and the quantity produced by the domestic rm
(16) into the welfare function of the home country (12), we nd
W xh =
a2
 
8h
2
f + 4
2
h + 12fh + 4h + 4
2
f + 4f + 1

(1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)
2 : (36)
Substituting (32), the prot of the domestic rm under FDI (30), the en-
vironmental tax rate (25) and the quantity produced by the domestic and the
15
foreign rm under FDI (27) into the welfare function of the home country (24),
we nd:
WRh =
a2
3 + 4h
: (37)
From (36), we see that:
W xh
f
=   4a
22h (3 + 8h)
(1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)
3 < 0: (38)
It then follows from (36) to (38) that the home countrys welfare is higher
with exports:11
W xh >
a2
1 + 2h
>
a2
3 + 4h
=WRh :
The rst inequality follows from (38) and letting f !1 in (36).
Substituting (32), the prot of the foreign rm under export (20), the envi-
ronmental tax rate (15), and the quantity produced by the domestic rm (16)
into the welfare function of the home country (10), we nd:
W xf = 2 (1 + 2f )

ha
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
2
: (39)
Under FDI, the foreign countrys welfare is equal to its rms prots. By
(30) and (32):
WRf =

2a
8h + 6
2
  F:
Now dene:
~WRf =W
R
f + F =

2a
8h + 6
2
(40)
From (39) and (40) we nd that W xf > (<) ~W
R
f for f > (<) ~f ;where
~f 
164h + 24
3
h + 3
2
h   5h   1 + h (3 + 4h)
q
h
 
163h + 24
2
h   5h   2

2 (1 + 2h)
2 :
(41)
The ~f curve is drawn in Figure 1 as "Welfare". To the left of this curve,
foreign welfare is higher with FDI if xed cost F is low enough. To the right
of the curve, foreign welfare is unambiguously higher with exports. As can be
11 In a di¤erent context, similar welfare implications are found in De Santis and Stähler
(2006).
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seen in Figure 1, as well as from (40) and (41), foreign welfare is higher with
exports for all values of h above 1.2.
We conclude that the home country is denitely worse o¤ and the foreign
country is probably worse o¤ when the foreign rm decides to undertake FDI
rather than to export. The fall in domestic welfare is due to the reductions in
consumer surplus, the prots of the domestic rm and environmental quality.
The increase in environmental tax revenues is not enough to compensate for
these losses. The foreign countrys welfare falls under FDI as the increase in
prot and in environmental quality is not enough to compensate for the loss
of environmental tax revenue under export regime. Although the foreign rms
decision to undertake FDI may make both countries worse o¤, the countries
governments have no way of discouraging FDI because, by assumption, they
cannot credibly commit to environmental policies before the rms location de-
cision.
For simplicity, we analyzed the welfare of both countries assuming equal
marginal production costs. Qualitatively the results under the welfare analysis
will be same even when the marginal production costs are di¤erent. When intro-
ducing cost asymmetry, following (1) with higher cost of the foreign rm under
FDI, the prot of the foreign rm will fall further than with cost symmetry.
Thus the welfare of the foreign country will be unambiguously lower with FDI
when introducing cost asymmetry.
In the case of the home country, welfare under export is higher with equal
marginal production cost. When introducing asymmetry, we see that with the
foreign rms cost higher under FDI than under export, domestic welfare under
export will be lower than with cost symmetry. Thus welfare under export will
be higher even with cost asymmetry.
4 Bertrand Case
Under the Bertrand case analysis, we assume that rm h and rm f produce
di¤erentiated products and compete as Bertrand duopolists in the home and
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foreign markets as in Clarke and Collie (2003). The marginal cost of production
of the domestic rm is constant and equal to ch while the marginal cost of
production of the foreign rm is constant and equal to cxf under exports (where
cxf also includes the transportation cost) and c
R
f under FDI.
12
We assume that:
cRf  cxf : (42)
Similar to the Cournot case, we assume that there is market demand only in
the home country and there is a representative consumer with quasi-linear pref-
erences that are described by a quadratic utility function. The utility function
of the representative consumer is:
U = qh + qf   1
2
 
q2h + q
2
f + 2qhqf

+ z (43)
where z is consumption of the numeraire good which is produced by a per-
fectly competitive industry using constant returns to scale technology. The
parameters of the utility function are assumed to satisfy the following condi-
tions: the maximum willingness to pay of consumers exceeds the marginal cost
of the rms, 1 > c > 0 ; and the products of the two rms are imperfect sub-
stitutes, 0 <  < 1. It turns out that is a key parameter in the model that
measures the degree of product substitutability, where  = 1 means that the
products of the two rms are perfect substitutes and  = 0 means that the two
products are independent.
In addition to (42), we impose a condition on the parameters such that:
tRh + c
R
f > t
x
f + c
x
f ; (44)
i.e. full marginal costs (including production and transport costs as well as
environmental taxation) are higher with FDI than with exports. We impose this
condition to make sure that the foreign rm does not relocate in order to take
12Subscripts i; i = f; h; refer to the foreign and home rm or country, respectively. Super-
scripts s; s = x;R refer to the scenario where the foreign rm is exporting and relocating,
respectively.
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advantage of lower costs in the home country.Using (58) and (67) where and are
solved for, we can write condition (44) in terms of exogenous parameters as:
f <
1
2
 4K   8Kh   2 + 3 + 4   5 + 2cxf   4cxf + 4K2
 22h + 24h   3ch + 5ch + 22hcxf   24hcxf + 6K2h 
2  2 K   + 2h + 2Kh   cxf + ch   2hcxf + 1
(45)
where
K =
0BBB@ cRf + cxf +
  16h   2ch + 2cRf   8h   3cRf   3ch
+8hch + 
3ch + 3c
R
f + 8hc
R
f + 4hc
R
f + 4hch

2 (+ 2)
 
+ 4h   2 + 2

1CCCA
Utility maximisation, subject to the budget constraint, yields the inverse
demand functions facing the two rm:
pi = 1  (qi + q i) (46)
Substituting (46) into (43), the utility of the representative consumer with
income I is:
U =
1
2
q2f + qfqh +
1
2
q2h + I
In a Bertrand duopoly, where price is the strategic variable of the rms, the
direct demand functions will generally be more useful than the inverse demand
functions; inverting (46) yields the direct demand functions in the home market
as:
qsi =
1 
1  2  (1  )  psi + ps i (47)
4.1 Government Policy
4.1.1 Under Export
In this sub-game the foreign rm has decided, in stage one, to export. We start
our analysis in stage three, where the two rms i, i = f; h, set the output levels
that maximize their prots xi :
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The prot of the two rms from sales in the home market are:
si = (p
s
i   ci   tsi ) qsi (48)
The rst-order conditions for the Bertrand equilibrium are:
d (si q
s
i )
dpsi
=
1 
1  2  ci     2psi + tsi + ps i + 1 (49)
with sh , 
s
f given by (48) and q
s
h , q
s
f given by (47).
The rst-order conditions for the Bertrand equilibrium from (49 )can be
rearranged to give the best-reply functions of the home and the foreign rm as:
pxi =
1
2
 
1  + cxi + txi + px i

The intersection of the two bestreply functions, gives the prices of the two
rms in the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium:
pxi =
2  + 2cxi + 2txi   2 + c i + tx i
(2  ) (+ 2) (50)
Substituting these prices (50) into the direct demand functions (47) yields
the sales of the two rms in the Bertrand equilibrium:
qxi =
 
cx i   2   + tx i + 2
   2  2 (ci + txi ) 
1  2  4  2 (51)
Using the prices from (50) and quantities (51) in (48) yields the prots of
the two rms in the Bertrand equilibrium:
xi =
  
cx i   2   + tx i + 2
   2  2 (ci + txi )2 
1  2  4  22 . (52)
In stage two, the home and foreign governments set the environmental tax
rates that maximize social welfare. Social welfare Wi in country i (i = h; f)
is the sum of rm is prot, consumer surplus (for the home country) and
environmental tax revenue, minus environmental damage.
The foreign government maximizes:
W xf = 
x
f + t
x
fq
x
f   f
 
qxf
2
; (53)
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with xf given by (52) and q
x
f given by (51). Di¤erentiating and solving for t
x
f ,
we get:
txf =
1
2

   2   2cxf + 2cxf + ch + txh + 2
 
2f
 
2  2+ 2  1  2 
2  2  2f   22   2f + 2 :
(54)
Similarly the home government maximizes:
W xh = 
x
h +

1
2
(qxh)
2
+  (qxh)
 
qxf

+
1
2
 
qxf
2
+ txhq
x
h   h (qxh)2 ; (55)
with xh given by (52) and q
x
h given by (51). Di¤erentiating and solving for t
x
h,
we get:
txh =
8h + 4ch + 9
2   64 + 6   4h   8hch   82h + 23h + 24h   92ch
+64ch   6ch + 82hch   24hch + 4hcxf + 4htxf   23hcxf   23htxf   4
8h   52 + 4   82h + 24h + 4
:
(56)
Substituting (54) into (56) and solving for txh we get:
txh =
0B@
 
4ch + 2
2   22ch   4

fh +
 
4   32   2ch + 32ch   4ch + 2

f+
2+ 4ch + 3
2   3 + 3cxf   32ch   2cxf   4

h
+
 
24   42   2ch + 42ch   24ch + 2

1CA
 2f   4h + 22   4fh + 2f + 32h + 22fh   2
:
(57)
From (57), we see that txh > 0 when:
h >
 
1  2  2f   22   2f + 2 (1  ch)
4  2+ 4f   4ch   32 + 3   3cxf   4fch   22f + 32ch + 2cxf + 22fch
Substituting (57) into (54) and solving for txf we get:
txf =
1
2
 
4f + 
2   4   22f
  + 2h   cxf + ch   2hcxf + 1
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
: (58)
From (58), we see that txf > 0 when:
f >
1
2
2 (1  ) + 1
2  2
Substituting (57) and (58) into (51), we nd the equilibrium output levels
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as:
qxh =
1
2
 + 4f   4ch   32 + cxf   4fch   22f + 32ch + 22fch + 4
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
(59a)
qxf =
1
2
 
2  2  + 2h   cxf + ch   2hcxf + 1
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
:(59b)
The conditions for the qxf and q
x
h to be positive are respectively are:
h >
1
2
+ cxf   ch   1
1  cxf
f >
1
2
+ 4ch + 3
2   32ch   cxf   4 
2  2 (1  ch)
Substituting (59a),(59b), (57) and (58) into the prot function (52), we get
the prots of both rms when the foreign rm is exporting:
xh =
1
4
 
1  2  + 4f   4ch   32 + cxf   4fch   22f + 32ch + 22fch + 42 
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
2 ;(60)
xf =
1
4
 
1  2  2  22  + 2h   cxf + ch   2hcxf + 12 
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
2 : (61)
4.1.2 Foreign rm has undertaken FDI
In this sub-game the foreign rm has decided, in stage one, to relocate its
plant to the home country. In stage three, each rm sets the output level that
maximizes its prots. The prot of the two rms from sales in the home market
are:
max
qRi
Ri =
 
pRi   cRi   tRh

qRi   Fi (62)
with cRh = ch and xed cost Ff = F; Fh = 0:The rst-order conditions for
the Bertrand equilibrium are:
d
 
Ri q
R
i

dpRi
=
1 
1  2  ci     2pRi + tRh + pR i + 1
with Rh , 
R
f given by (62) and q
R
h , q
R
f given by (47).
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These rst-order conditions can be rearranged to give the best-reply func-
tions of the home and the foreign rm as:
pRi =
1
2
 
1  + cRi + tRh + pR i

The intersection of the two best reply functions, gives the prices of the two
rms in the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium:
pRi =
2  + 2cRi + 2tRh   2 + c i + tRh
(2  ) (+ 2) (63)
Substituting the prices from (63) into the direct demand functions (47) yields
the sales of the two rms in the Bertrand equilibrium:
qRi =
2    2ci   2tRh   2 + cR i + tRh + 2ci + 2tRh
(1  ) (+ 1) (2  ) (+ 2) (64)
Using the prices from (63) and quantities (64) in (62) yields the prots of
the two rms in the Bertrand equilibrium:
Ri =
 
2    2cRi   2tRh   2 + c i + tRh + 2cRi + 2tRh
2
(1  ) (+ 1) (  2)2 (+ 2)2 (65)
In stage two of the game, the home government sets the welfare maximising
environmental tax rate:
max
tRh
Wh = 
R
h+

1
2
 
qRh
2
+ 
 
qRh
  
qRf

+
1
2
 
qRf
2
+tRh
 
qRh + q
R
f
 h  qRh + qRf 2 :
(66)
with Rh given by (65) and q
R
h and q
R
f by (64). Taking the rst order condi-
tion and simplifying for tRh ; we get:
tRh =
1
2
16h   2cRf + 2ch + 8h   3cRf + 3ch
 8hcRf   8hch + 3cRf   3ch   4hcRf   4hch
(+ 2)
 
+ 4h   2 + 2
 : (67)
We see that tRh > 0 when:
h >
1
4
(2  ) (+ 1)2 c
R
f   ch
(+ 2)

2  ch   cRf

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Substituting the environmental tax rate (67) into the output levels of the
rms (64) yields the prot maximizing output levels as follows:
qRf =
1
2
 2  3cRf   ch   22 + 2ch   4hcRf + 4hch + 2cRf + 2ch + 4
(1  ) (+ 2)  + 4h   2 + 2 ,(68a)
qRh =
1
2
 2+ cRf   5ch   22 + 2cRf + 4hcRf   4hch   2cRf + 32ch + 4
(1  ) (+ 2)  + 4h   2 + 2 :(68b)
The conditions for qRf > 0 and q
R
h > 0 are respectively:
h <
1
4
 2  ch   22   3cRf + 2cRf + 2ch + 2ch + 4
cRf   ch
h <
1
4
2+ 5ch + 2
2   cRf + 2cRf   32ch   2cRf   4
cRf   ch
Finally, the two rmsprots are, substituting (67) into (62):
Rf =
1
4
(+ 1)

 2  3cRf   ch   22 + 2ch   4hcRf + 4hch + 2cRf + 2ch + 4
2
(1  ) (+ 2)2  + 4h   2 + 22   F &(69)
Rh =
1
4
(+ 1)

2  cRf + 5ch + 22   2cRf   4hcRf + 4hch + 2cRf   32ch   4
2
(1  ) (+ 2)2  + 4h   2 + 22 : (70)
4.2 Export or FDI?
Having analyzed the second (government policy) and third (rmsoutput) stages
of the game in the previous section, we now move to stage one where the foreign
rm decides between exporting and undertaking FDI. The foreign rm prefers
FDI to exports if Rf > 
x
f :
Comparing the foreign rms prots (69) under FDI and (61) under export,
we nd:
Lemma 4: The foreign rm prefers FDI to exporting if and only if its xed
cost of relocation F is below F^ , where
F^  1
4
(+ 1)

 2  3cRf   ch   22 + 2ch   4hcRf + 4hch + 2cRf + 2ch + 4
2
(1  ) (+ 2)2  + 4h   2 + 22
 1
4
 
1  2  2  22  + 2h   cxf + ch   2hcxf + 12 
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
2 :
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F^ may be negative, which means that prots under exports are higher than
under FDI, even without taking relocation costs into account. Thus for FDI to
be protable, F^ has to be positive.
From Lemma 4.1, this implies
Proposition 3: The foreign rm prefers FDI to exports for low enough
relocation costs F if and only if:
(+ 1)

 2  3cRf   ch   22 + 2ch   4hcRf + 4hch + 2cRf + 2ch + 4
2
(1  ) (+ 2)2  + 4h   2 + 22 (71)
>
 
1  2  2  22  + 2h   cxf + ch   2hcxf + 12 
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
2 ;
and this along with qRh > 0 is satised only if
h < f :
To explain the intuition behind this result, we substitute the prots under
export and under FDI from (61) and (65) to rewrite condition (71) as:
2    2cRf   2tRh   2 + ch + tRh + 2cRf + 2tRh
2
 
1  2  4  22 >
 
ch   2   + txh + 2
   2  2 cxf + txf2 
1  2  4  22 :
Rearranging yields:
Corollary 3: The foreign rms prefers FDI to export for low enough relo-
cation cost F if and only if :
 
tRh + ch
  (txh + ch) >  2  2  tRh + cRf    txf + cxf ;
i.e. the home rms increase in full marginal cost should be su¢ ciently
higher than than that of the foreign rm´ s adjusted by the degree of product
di¤erentiation.
We see that although FDI raises the foreign rms own cost, it can still
be worthwhile for the rm to relocate, as FDI may raise its competitors cost
by even more. As Lemma 4.1 has shown, the home government increases its
environmental tax rate with FDI, because domestic production and pollution
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will be higher with two rms in the country than with one rm. It is therefore
clear that FDI raises the home rms costs. FDI also raises the foreign rms
costs by assumption (44) which we have made to rule out lower costs as a motive
for FDI.
We further see from Corollary 1 that, this result would depend on the degree
of product di¤erentiation. If the degree of product di¤erentiation is very high,
i.e.,  ! 0, the increase in the marginal cost of the home rm should be very
high, for the foreign rm to nd it protable to relocate to the home country.
Therefore, for FDI to take place, the products should not be su¢ ciently di¤eren-
tiated and higher degree of product di¤erentiation would reduces the possibility
of relocation by the foreign rm.
4.3 Equal Production Costs
In this section we examine the special case where the marginal costs of produc-
tion of the foreign rm under export and under FDI are equal to the marginal
cost of production of the domestic rm:
cRf = c
x
f = ch = c: (72)
Under condition (72), comparing the foreign rms prots under FDI and
under export from (69) and (61), we nd:
Lemma 5: The foreign rm prefers FDI to exporting if and only if its xed
cost of relocation F is below F^ , where
F^ 
 
1  2 (1  c)2 
+ 4h   2 + 2
2 14
 
1  2  2  22 (1  c)2 (1  + 2h)2 
2f + 4h   22 + 4fh   2f   32h   22fh + 2
2
F^ may be negative, which means that prots under exports are higher than
under FDI, even without taking relocation costs into account. Thus for FDI to
be protable, F^ has to be positive.
Under condition (72), the foreign rm prefers FDI to exporting for low
26
enough relocation cost F if and only if:
f >
0BBB@12
 2+ 8h   22 + 33 + 24   5 + 162h
 822h   4h   62h + 23h + 24h 
2  2 (2h + 1)
1CCCA : (73)
Corollary 4.1 now becomes:
Corollary 4: Under condition (72), the foreign rm prefers FDI to export-
ing for low enough relocation cost F if and only if:
 
tRh   txh

>
 
2  2

 
tRh   txf

i.e. the tax increase for the domestic rm should be su¢ ciently higher than
than that of the foreign rms, adjusted by the degree of product di¤erentiation.
Condition (3) that ensures that costs for the foreign rm are larger in the
home country now becomes tRh > t
x
f : From setting condition under (72) in (25)
and (15), we see that this holds when:
f <
1
2
16h   22 + 3 + 44   25   26 + 7 + 322h   3222h
+842h   242h + 23h + 104h   25h   26h
(1  )  2  2  + 4h   2 + 2h + 2 (74)
From (68a),(68b), (59b) and (59a), we see that the output levels qRf ; q
R
h ; q
x
h; q
x
f
will always be positive with (72). Similarly, from (58) and (67), we see that txf
and tRh is positive with (72). Substituting (72) into (57), we see that t
x
h > 0
holds when:
h >
 
1  2 2f   22   2f + 2 2+ 4f   32 + 3   22f + 4 : (75)
4.3.1 Illustration of the Bertrand Case when  = 0:5
Substituting  = 0:5;we can rewrite (73) the condition for F^ > 0 (the curve
marked in red) as:
f >
0:285 71
2h + 1
 
14:02h + 4: 875h   1: 031 3

27
In Figure 2, this condition is satised above the "FDI" curve.
Substituting  = 0:5;and inverting we can rewrite (75) the condition for
txh > 0 (the curve marked in red) as:
f >  38h   18
56h   21
In Figure 2, this condition is satised to the right of the curve marked
"txh > 0".
Substituting  = 0:5;we can rewrite (74) the condition for txf < t
R
h (the curve
marked in black) as:
f <
1
56
1380:0h + 3136:0
2
h   27:0
20:0h + 9:0
In Figure 2, this condition is satised below the line marked "tRh > t
x
f".
Figure 2: Environmental damage coe¢ cients f and h where FDI is preferred
over exports under Bertrand Competition
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5 Conclusion and Discussion
It is widely feared that lenient environmental regulation attracts investment
by polluting rms. In this paper under both Cournot and Bertrand model
duopoly settings, we show that the opposite can hold: A foreign rm may
invest in the home country although total costs (taking the costs of production,
environmental taxation and transportation into account) are higher there.
We have seen that while under Cournot duopoly model for the the investment
to pay o¤, the increase in the competitor (home) rms costs should be more
than twice the amount of the foreign rms own costs, under Bertrand duopoly
setting, the competitors (home) rm´s cost increase should be su¢ ciently higher
than that of the foreign rm´s adjusted by the degree of product di¤erentiation.
Both these are cases of raising ones rivals costs. The home rms costs rise
because of the increase in the environmental tax rate which is necessitated by
the foreign rms relocation decision. Since we have assumed that FDI raises
the foreign rms cost of production, the rise in the environmental stringency is
the only reason for FDI.
For simplicity we have assumed a linear demand curve and constant marginal
production costs. Introducing more general functional forms would, however,
not change our basic result that a rm will undertake FDI in countries with
higher cost and stricter environmental regulation, as long as the di¤erence be-
tween the rivals cost increase and its own cost increase is large enough.
We have assumed there is a single domestic rm. When there are multiple
domestic rms, their costs need to rise by less than twice the foreign rms
costs in order to make FDI protable (cf. Michaelis, 1994). On the other hand,
FDI will cause a smaller increase in the environmental tax rate with multiple
domestic rms. We further also assume that neither rm can reduce their
emissions by doing any abatement activities. If the rms do R&D for pollution
abatement, the same results would hold as long as the R&D decision is made
after the government sets the optimal environmental tax rate. If we assume
that the rms could do pollution abatement, say by reducing the emission per
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unit of output, then subsequently the cost of the rms would decrease as the
emission tax the rms have to pay would fall. This would imply that the cost
increase for the home rm when the foreign rm relocates would be less and
would result in less incentive to do FDI for the foreign rm.
We assume that there is market demand only in the home country for sim-
plicity. Introducing market demand in the foreign country would result in pos-
sibilities like bilateral FDI, two plants for either rms or export only by either
rms depending on factors like market sizes in countries, the xed cost of reloca-
tion and the marginal environmental damage functions. De Santis and Stähler
(2006) analyses these possibilities for the case of symmetric countries and rms.
In our model with asymmetric rms and countries, nding the equilibrium would
be di¢ cult. However, if we restrict the analysis and assume that only the for-
eign rm is capable of doing FDI, the result would still hold as the foreign
rms relocation would lead to production for both markets leading to higher
environmental pollution, higher tax and subsequently higher cost increase for
the domestic rm.
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6 Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1.
From (14) and (25):
tRh   txh =
aRf (3 + 4h)  6ah
6 + 8h
  ah
2
+
2ah (1 + 2f ) + 2ha
x
f
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
: (76)
From (27), qRf > 0 if and only if:
aRf (3 + 4h) > ah (1 + 4h) : (77)
Thus we see that the minimum value aRf (3 + 4h) can take is ah (1 + 4h)
and the minimum value of axf is a
R
f applying (77) to the rst fraction on the
R.H.S of (76) and (5) to the third fraction we get:
tRh   txh =
 4ah
3 + 4h
+
2ah (1 + 2f ) + 2ha
x
f
1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh
: (78)
Rearranging (77), we get:
aRf >
ah (1 + 4h)
(3 + 4h)
: (79)
Applying the minimum value of aRf from (79) into 78) yields:
tRh txh =
2ah [(2f + 1) (4h + 3) + h (4h + 1)  2 (1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)]
(3 + 4h) (1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh)
> 0:
The second inequality follows because the term between square brackets in
the numerator can be rewritten as:
(2f + 1) (4h + 3)+h (4h + 1) 2 (1 + 2f + 3h + 4fh) = 2f+1+h (4h   1) > 0:
The inequality follows from (19).
Appendix B. Proof of h < f in Proposition 1.
Rewriting (31), the foreign rm will nd it protable to do FDI for low
enough F if
aRf
ah
>
2axf (4h + 3) (2h + 1) + ah

122h   h   5 + 2f (4h + 1) (2h + 1)

ah (3 + 4h) (1 + 3h + 2f (1 + 2h))
:
(80)
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From (27), qRh > 0 if and only if:
aRf
ah
<
4h + 5
4h + 3
: (81)
We will show that when f  h, inequalities (80) and (81) cannot hold
simultaneously.
On di¤erentiating the R.H.S of (80) with respect to f we get:
d

2axf (4h+3)(2h+1)+ah(12
2
h h 5+2f (4h+1)(2h+1))
ah(3+4h)(1+3h+2f (1+2h))

df
=   4
ah
(2h + 1)

axf   ah + 2haxf

(2f + 3h + 4fh + 1)
2 < 0:
The inequality follows from (17). Thus the R.H.S of (80) is decreasing in
f . This is because the higher environmental damage, the higher will be the
environmental tax rate in the foreign country and the more inclined the foreign
rm will be toward FDI. Thus the lowest possible value of the R.H.S in (80) for
f  h is where f = h = . A necessary condition for (80) to hold is then:
aRf
ah
>
ah (4+ 5)
 
42 +   1+ 2axf (3 + 4) (2+ 1)
ah (3 + 4) (4+ 1) (+ 1)
: (82)
The R.H.S of (82) is increasing in axf . The lowest possible value that the
R.H.S can take is when axf is at its minimum value, which by (5) is a
R
f . Thus
setting aRf = a
x
f , a necessary condition for (82) to hold is:
aRf
ah
>
ah (4+ 5)
 
42 +   1+ 2aRf (3 + 4) (2+ 1)
ah (3 + 4) (4+ 1) (+ 1)
:
Rearranging and solving for aRf =ah yields:
aRf
ah
>
4+ 5
3 + 4
:
This is clearly irreconcilable with condition (81) for qRh > 0. On the other
hand, if h < f , it would be possible for the foreign rm to prefer FDI and
still face the domestic rm.
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